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Insider trading and the STOCK Act Amendment 
 
Josh Wilson 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
On April 2, 2012, Congress passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) 
Act. The purpose of this legislation was to enhance transparency among the financial 
investments of Congress members, congressional staffers, and other government employees. One 
year later, an amendment was passed which no longer required staffers or government employees 
to publish their holdings online citing “national security”. Treating this event as a natural 
experiment, I examine whether insider trading occurred in the days leading up to and through the 
signing of the law by President Obama. In general, I find that portfolios of the 50 most 
commonly held stocks by Congress significantly outperformed the market in the days leading up 
to the amendment. Additionally, I find that political affiliation and the number/amount of 
congressional holdings provided no meaningful impact on these returns.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 “Power is a lot like real estate. It’s all about location, location, location. The closer you 
are to the source, the higher your property value.”  
      -Frank Underwood, House of Cards 
During much of 2017, the approval rating of the U.S. Congress was below 20%.1 While 
this lack of approval might be explained by perceived inability to enact meaningful changes, a 
2015 Gallup poll showed that more than 50% of those surveyed believed that most members of 
congress were corrupt.  To compound this issue, academic research in finance shows that 
portfolios that mimic those of congressional holdings tend to outperform the market by 6% to 
10% per year.  In an effort to constrain members of congress from trading on privileged 
information, the Obama Administration passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge 
(STOCK) Act on April 4th, 2012 following two months of heated debate in both chambers of 
legislature. The purpose of the Act was to prevent “any nonpublic information derived from 
individual’s position…or gained from performance of the individual’s duties, for personal 
benefit2.” The Act required all United States Congressmen, Congressional employees, and 
employees of the Executive and Judicial Branches to publically disclose 1) their financial 
holdings at the end of each calendar year and 2) large stock trades within 45 days throughout the 
year. 
																																								 																				
1	See,	for	example,	http://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx.	
2	See	Restrictions	on	Insider	Trading	Under	Securities	Laws	and	Ethics	Rules,	United	States	
Senate,	December	4,	2012,	1-2.	
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 Prior to the STOCK Act, The Senate Code of Official Conduct and The Ethics Manual 
for Members, Officers, and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives did not place any 
restrictions on trading acquisitions. As mentioned above, prior research has shown portfolios that 
mimic U.S. Senators beat the market by approximately 10% annually (Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd, 
and Ziobrowski (2004)) and investments of members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
outperform the market by approximately 6% annually (Ziobrowski, Boyd, Cheng, and 
Ziobrowski (2011)). While these returns do not explicitly demonstrate the prevalence of immoral 
behavior, they do, however, cause one to question the integrity of the system.  
The following year on April 11th, 2013, however, the Senate passed an amendment to the 
bill which exempted those previously affected by the requirement from the duty of posting their 
investments online. This amendment was passed unanimously and without discussion in 14 
seconds right before the weekend. The House followed suit on April 12th, 2013 and President 
Obama signed the bill into law on April 15th, 2013. The National Academy of Public 
Administration would later cite that the amendment was necessary since the disclosure 
requirements could compromise “national security”. The only place to access these records 
became the basement of the Cannon House Office Building in Washington D.C., far from the 
transparency previously sought after. This event provides a natural experiment for the 
examination of potential insider trading in the weeks preceding and through the amendment 
passage. While the first bill was debated openly, the amendment was passed quickly and 
efficiently into law with little to no coverage. 
Previous examination of the STOCK Act has found that bid-ask spreads widened and 
volatility increased in response to the amendment, suggesting increased information asymmetry 
(Blau and Whitby (2015)). Using the 50 most held stocks by Congress (both in years 2012 and 
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2013), I examine stock returns for various time-windows surrounding the amendment passage. 
The question I am attempting to answer is whether the relaxation of disclosure laws by the 2013 
STOCK amendment could lead to a perceived increase in insider trading among the most 
commonly held stocks by members of Congress. My hypothesis is that congressional leaders 
have additional access to non-public information, and can therefore make more informed and 
more profitable investment decisions. The easing of laws for those who are “located closer to the 
source”, such as Congressional staffers and members of the other branches of government, could 
result in increased outflow of information captured by security prices, which may be good news 
for stocks most held by members of Congress. The results show that Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) leading up to the election are significant and outperform the market by between 
1-2%, which is equivalent to over 70% annualized. The statistical significance of these returns 
then tails off following the signing of the bill. This result is not surprising considering that the 
bill passed both chambers 3-4 days before the bill was signed into law. Additionally, other 
exogenous events may be effecting the statistical significance of the returns, mainly the Boston 
Marathon Bombing which occurred on the day President Obama signed the bill into law. 
However, finding abnormal returns during the pre-event period suggests that the Marathon 
Bombing is not confounding the first set of my tests. For robustness, I replicate the CARs using 
both the Scholes Williams and Market-Adjusted Return models using both Equal and Value 
weighted indices. Next, I perform a regression to estimate if partisanship was influential in 
driving the pre-event CARs. A variable was created using the number of Republican 
Congressman invested in a particular stock divided by the number Democratic Congressman, 
holding a variety of variables constant. The variable was found to be significant in the 
regression. The interpretation of the variable is that as the number of Republicans invested in a 
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company rises, the expected return decreases, though only slightly. Finally, I replicated the same 
regression, this time, however, looking at whether the investment amount of the Congressional 
member was significant in the return and found the variable to be insignificant.  
The rest of this paper follows. Section 2 describes the data used throughout the analysis. 
Section 3 presents the results from our empirical tests. Section 4 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
2. DATA  
In order to examine whether the amendment to the STOCK Act stimulated insider 
trading, I gathered stock returns for windows leading up to and through the amendment to the 
law from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. I constructed two 
portfolios of the 50 most commonly held stocks by members of Congress as reported by the 
Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). Table 1, Panels A and B, report the stocks for the year end 
2012 and 2013 along with the number of individuals from each political party invested in each 
security.3 Additionally, members of Congress are not required to post a specific amount invested 
in each stock, but an investment window. I report the summation of the minimum investment 
windows as provided by the CRP. The 2012 and 2013 portfolios are very similar with only a 
handful of exceptions demonstrating that Congressional members likely preferred longer buy and 
hold strategies. This supports the reasoning for use of 2012 and 2013 year-end snapshots of 
Congressional portfolios.   
																																								 																				
3 Unfortunately, data regarding Congressional holdings at the time of the amendment is 
unavailable. Therefore, I conduct my analysis for both 2012 and then for 2013 holdings. 
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Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the 2012 and 2013 portfolio of the 50 most 
commonly held stocks by Congress. The companies have an average stock price of $86.36, as 
well as Market Capitalizations ranging from $29-$394 billion, with an average of $134.62 
billion. I find that these investments tend to be highly established, blue-chip firms that are also 
highly regulated. The trading volume, spread, and volatility of these investments follow the trend 
of blue-chip stocks. The variable NASDAQ was created as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
stock is listed on the NASDAQ, and 0 if otherwise. This result shows that 25% of the stocks in 
the portfolio are listed on the NASDAQ. 
 
3. RESULTS  
To begin the analysis, I first examine the CARs for the two portfolios of stocks held by 
Congress. Both portfolios are comprised of the 50 most commonly held stocks held by Congress. 
The first portfolio reported at the end of 2012, the second reported at the end of the following 
year, 2013. The event in question took place on April 15th, 2013. The minimal differences 
between the two datasets suggests that Congressional members tended to hold these securities for 
longer than a year—possibly as part of a buy and hold strategy and likely in order to capture tax 
advantages of the capital gains tax rate. I note that while the original STOCK Act was debated 
for months leading up to the final signing of the bill into law, the amendment was passed in a 
relatively short time-span with little to no discussion. While the effects of insider trading would 
be difficult to capture significantly over a larger time-span, I posit that this provides a natural 
experiment to examine insider trading in the days leading up to and through the passage of the 
amendment. 
	7	
3.1 The Effect of the STOCK Act Amendment Pre-Post Period 
 In Table 3, Panels A and B, I examine the CARs for the days surrounding the 
amendment. Captured in the (-1,1) window is the voting that took place on April 11th and 12th in 
both chambers of Congress, and before the Act was signed into law. Additionally, the days 
following the amendment passage may be influenced by the Boston Marathon Bombing, 
although that event would affect the entire market as opposed to the treatment sample of stocks 
that are most held by Congress. Panel A displays the results for the 2012 congressional holdings 
and Panel B for the 2013 congressional holdings. I begin with the shortest timespan and then 
report my findings by increasing each CAR time window. For the (-1,1) time period, I find a 
positive CAR of 1.30% for the time period, or over 100% annualized. These returns are 
significant at the .05 level for the Market Model [1] (MM), the Market-Adjusted Returns Model 
[2] (MAR) and the Scholes Williams Model [3] (SW) for both the 2012 and the 2013 holdings. 
As I move down Table 3 Panels A and B, I increase the CAR windows as to capture a larger time 
period. While the statistical significance holds for the Columns 1-2, it tails off for Columns 3-6. 
Furthermore, the reported calculated return can be interpreted as a return over the time period, so 
although CAR(-5,5) and CAR(-30,2) have a larger return than CAR(-1,1), the annualized return 
is much smaller. 
3.2 The Effect of the STOCK Act Amendment Pre-Period and Post-Period 
In Table 4 Panels A and B, I examine CARs in the days prior to the passage of the 
amendment. CAR(-5,0), CAR(-3,0), and CAR(-1,0) took place in the same week that the 
amendment was passed in both chambers, and maintained the highest statistical significance 
across the treatment groups. This conclusion is not surprising due to the nature of the event. 
Congress approved the bill in 14 seconds with little to no discussion. This also occurred at a time 
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of extreme deadlock between parties. It is reasonable to assume that those affected would be 
aware of the amendment and likelihood of passing before the event took place. These results 
suggest that non-public information began to be incorporated into stock returns before the bill 
was signed into law. These results are consistent through both the 2012 and the 2013 holdings 
and for models using the equal weighted index as the benchmark. I note, however, the results are 
not consistent for models using the value weighted index. These results suggest that the observed 
positive CARs surrounding the amendment are abnormally high during the period before the 
amendment is passed. Given the prior research that shows that portfolios consisting of stocks 
most held by Congress exhibit positive alpha, finding that the amendment that relaxes the trading 
constraints of Congressional Staffers results in abnormally high returns is straightforward and 
suggests that the amendment is “good news” for our treatment sample of stocks. Furthermore, 
and perhaps more importantly, findings indicate that the results are driven by the pre-amendment 
period, which is perhaps the result of exogenous factors that took place after the signing of the 
bill. 
Table 5 examines the effects on the CARs that took place after the bill was signed into 
law. I find lessening statistical significance beyond CAR(0,1), likely due to exogenous factors 
such as the Boston Marathon Bombing which occurred on the same day that the bill was signed. 
CAR(0,3) and CAR(0,5) are not reliably different from zero for any of the models. This suggests 
that in the same week the bill was signed, the information held by insiders had already become 
incorporated into the share price of the stocks just three days after Obama signed the bill.  
3.3 Partisanship in the STOCK Act 
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In this section, I test whether the abnormal returns found during the pre-amendment 
period are driven by a particular party affiliation. CAR(-5,0) was selected as the dependent, or 
left-side variable because it yielded the most statistically significant CAR in Tables 3-5. 
CAR(-5,0)i = β1Ln(Repub/Dem)i + β2Ln(Pricei) + β3Ln(MarketCapi) + β4Ln(Spreadi) + 
β5Ln(Illiquidityi) + β6Ln(Volatilityi) + β7Ln(Turnover))+ β8NASDAQi + α + εi 
 
As shown in Table 4, CAR(-5,0) displayed p-values below the .01 level for many of the models 
estimated. For Tables 6-7, the independent variable was chosen as the natural log of the number 
of Congressional Republicans invested in a particular stock divided by the number of Democrats 
as reported in Table 1. Table 5 shows that the variable for Repub/Dem, MarketCap, Spread, 
Illiquidity, and Turnover were significant at the .05 level in Columns 1-4. Interestingly, only 
Illiquidity was significant in Table 6 for the 2013 data set. The CAR(-5,0) in the 2013 data set 
were far more significant than for the 2012, suggesting that the excess returns may be explained 
by insider trading, assuming that the 2013 dataset is more accurate. While the t statistic in Table 
5 Columns 1-4 is significant at the .05 level for Ln(Repub/Dem), the coefficient is small enough 
as to render the effect partisanship has on CAR(-5,0) meaningless.  In conclusion, the results 
suggest that whether the Congressional representative investing in the company was Republican 
or Democratic does not meaningfully explain CAR(-5,0). 
 Next, I conducted a similar regression on the significance of the minimum reported 
investment in the explanation of the abnormal return for CAR(-5,0) in Tables 8-9. The variable 
for Ln(Repub/Dem) in Tables 6-7 was replaced with Ln(MinInvest) in the cross-sectional 
regressions. Ln(MinInvest) is the summation of the minimum amount of investment reported for 
each security in Tables 1. 
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CAR(-5,0)i = β1Ln(MinInvest)i + β2Ln(Pricei) + β3Ln(MarketCapi) + β4Ln(Spreadi) + 
β5Ln(Illiquidityi) + β6Ln(Volatilityi) + β7Ln(Turnover))+ β8NASDAQi + α + εi 
 
Congress is required to disclose a window for which the security is valued at the time of the 
report. These windows were summated by political party and reported in Table 1. The control 
variables proved equally significant in Tables 6-7, with the exception of the independent 
variable, Ln(MinInvest). The findings suggest that the amount of investment for which the 
member of Congress have invested in the stock is not significant in explaining CAR(-5,0). We 
are left to conclude that while the returns are abnormally high for stocks most held by Congress 
surrounding the amendment, the results are not driven by the amount of investment by members 
of Congress. 
3.4 Explanation of Control Variables 
Due to the differences between the specified treatment group of 50 stocks selected by 
Congressional representatives, seven control variables were created for the regression. Ln(Price) 
is the natural log of the price of all the securities in the data set. Ln(MarketCap) is calculated as 
the price per share times shares outstanding for each security. Ln(Spread) is the difference 
between the Bid and Ask price. Ln(Illiquidity) is a measure of liquidity calculated by the 
absolute value of return divided by volume times price. Ln(Volatility) is the natural log of the 
difference between the daily high ask price to low bid price. Ln(Turnover) is calculated as 
volume divided by shares outstanding. NASDAQ was created as a dummy variable where the 
value was set as 1 if the stock was listed on the NASDAQ or 0 if listed otherwise. 
4. CONCLUSION  
On April 15, 2013, President Obama signed an amendment to the Stop Trading on 
Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act which eliminated many of the disclosure requirements 
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that had been implemented only one year prior. I examine whether insider trading took place in 
the days surrounding this event by observing stock returns of the 50 most commonly held stocks 
by Congress. I then compare these returns in an attempt to extrapolate whether insider trading 
took place by examining price movements.  
Throughout the analysis, I use stock data from Center for Research in Securities Prices 
and Congressional investment data from the Center for Responsive Politics. Findings indicate 
that in the days leading up to the amendment, the 50 common stocks most held by Congress 
outperform the market by 1.11%.to 1.68%, depending on the models estimated. This is 
equivalent to 55.94% to 84.67% annualized. This trend quickly dissipates following the signing 
of the bill. I estimate that this dissipation is due to the nature of the amendment passage. The 
amendment passed both houses in 14 seconds with no discussion. It is reasonable to conclude 
that those who were affected by the STOCK Act were aware of the amendment and its likelihood 
of passing before the actual vote took place. Although the political party is statistically 
significant in the regression of CAR(-5,0), the coefficient on the statistic is minimal as to render 
the interpretation meaningless. I find the minimum investment window to be insignificant in 
explaining CAR(-5,0). This suggests that CAR(-5,0) is meaningful regardless of political party 
or amount of investment.  
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Table 1 Panel A-2012 Treatment Sample of Stocks with Highest Level of Congressional Holdings 
The table reports the ticker symbols, the number of members of the U.S. Congress holding the particular stock, the number of 
Congressional Democrats holding the particular stock, the number of Congressional Republicans holding the particular stock, 
the minimum investment by Democrats, and the minimum investment by Republicans. 
Ticker Company Name All Congress Number of 
Democrats  
Number of 
Republicans 
Democratic 
Investment 
Republican 
Investment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
GE General Electric 84 38 45 $927,777  $2,211,661  
PG Procter & Gamble 69 31 37 $751,909  $7,605,325  
MSFT Microsoft Corp 65 32 33 $1,759,463  $1,869,722  
WFC Wells Fargo 63 28 35 $728,254  $1,418,476  
AAPL Apple Inc 62 30 31 $2,342,043  $2,185,006  
XOM Exxon Mobil 55 18 36 $2,107,687  $3,427,108  
JPM JPMorgan Chase & Co 55 24 31 $2,363,864  $980,670  
CSCO Cisco Systems 52 22 29 $138,249  $493,584  
INTL Intel Corp 50 25 25 $179,432  $625,452  
JNJ Johnson & Johnson 49 19 29 $637,508  $1,449,288  
T AT&T Inc 49 15 34 $118,020  $1,508,383  
IBM IBM Corp 48 21 26 $1,178,944  $1,853,872  
PFE Pfizer Inc 47 19 28 $303,420  $1,288,123  
KO Coca-Cola Co 46 19 27 $460,714  $2,017,631  
PEP PepsiCo Inc 46 20 25 $1,324,874  $1,419,010  
CVX Chevron Corp 45 17 28 $476,815  $2,882,511  
VZ Verizon Communications 43 16 27 $120,022  $708,012  
BAC Bank of America 41 16 25 $107,138  $846,320  
DIS Walt Disney Co 40 23 16 $302,958  $148,535  
MCD McDonald's Corp 40 18 22 $356,817  $952,664  
QCOM Qualcomm Inc 38 17 20 $397,903  $1,216,722  
GLD SPDR Gold Trust ETF 37 14 22 $173,566  $1,129,567  
MRK Merck & Co 33 11 22 $188,319  $1,820,906  
MMM 3M Co 32 15 16 $255,017  $900,829  
BRK.A Berkshire Hathaway 31 13 18 $1,542,967  $2,026,072  
WMT Wal-Mart Stores 30 12 18 $316,590  $762,064  
ABT Abbott Laboratories 29 9 20 $131,012  $1,343,758  
HD Home Depot 29 13 16 $278,825  $417,211  
CMCSA Comcast Corp 29 14 15 $433,407  $421,523  
GOOG Google Inc 29 10 18 $465,193  $1,497,821  
ORCL Oracle Corp 28 11 16 $289,318  $677,815  
UTX United Technologies 28 11 16 $1,157,417  $515,381  
BMY Bristol-Myers Squibb 28 11 17 $83,013  $421,436  
SLB Schlumberger Ltd 27 12 14 $293,383  $1,313,689  
C Citigroup Inc 27 12 15 $79,883  $428,774  
VOD Vodafone Group 27 14 13 $152,019  $155,768  
EMC EMC Corp 25 10 14 $41,013  $122,728  
UNP Union Pacific Corp 23 9 14 $152,971  $1,106,073  
AXP American Express 23 8 14 $56,007  $358,281  
KMB Kimberly-Clark Corp 22 9 12 $128,010  $2,129,345  
KRFT Kraft Foods Group 22 7 15 $7,007  $160,893  
MDLZ Mondelez International 22 8 14 $51,009  $594,022  
PM Philip Morris International 22 7 15 $90,195  $591,752  
MO Altria Group 21 6 15 $5,006  $575,751  
COP ConocoPhillips 21 6 15 $1,033,007  $329,516  
HP Hewlett-Packard 20 6 14 $26,130  $92,906  
ESRX Express Scripts 20 7 13 $8,008  $603,872  
F Ford Motor Co 19 8 11 $23,656  $126,292  
DD Travelers Companies 19 5 14 $98,007  $142,273  
AMZN Amazon.com 19 6 13 $119,251  $187,161  
	 14	
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Panel B-2013 Treatment Sample of Stocks with Highest Level of Congressional Holdings 
The table reports the ticker symbols, the number of members of the U.S. Congress holding the particular stock, the number of 
Congressional Democrats holding the particular stock, the number of Congressional Republicans holding the particular stock, 
the minimum investment by Democrats, and the minimum investment by Republicans. 
Ticker Company Name All Congress Number of 
Democrats  
Number of 
Republicans 
Democratic 
Investment 
Republican 
Investment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
GE General Electric 75 29 45 $1,055,649  $1,965,498  
PG Procter & Gamble 60 24 35 $669,031  $7,847,869  
WFC Wells Fargo 60 22 38 $493,436  $2,478,016  
MSF Microsoft Corp 59 26 33 $450,036  $2,317,072  
AAPL Apple Inc 59 18 40 $1,835,025  $1,706,902  
JPM JPMorgan Chase & Co 53 18 34 $383,184  $1,350,179  
T AT&T Inc 51 14 37 $131,019  $1,777,557  
XOM Exxon Mobil 50 14 35 $2,082,018  $3,142,873  
CVX Chevron Corp 50 15 35 $382,016  $3,279,735  
VZ Verizon Communications 50 16 34 $121,023  $1,138,640  
IBM IBM Corp 48 19 27 $815,023  $1,849,119  
BAC Bank of America 48 15 33 $215,180  $692,680  
JNJ Johnson & Johnson 46 18 27 $578,028  $1,776,639  
CSCO Cisco Systems 46 18 27 $89,021  $469,006  
KO Coca-Cola Co 44 21 23 $436,029  $2,264,040  
PFE Pfizer Inc 44 14 30 $224,784  $1,607,302  
PEP PepsiCo Inc 43 19 23 $1,323,022  $2,140,260  
INTL Intel Corp 43 19 24 $166,019  $932,601  
DIS Walt Disney Co 40 18 21 $365,026  $742,905  
BRK.A Berkshire Hathaway 38 15 22 $2,726,025  $2,757,908  
QCOM Qualcomm Inc 38 14 23 $414,021  $1,505,297  
CMCSA Comcast Corp 36 13 23 $617,013  $908,884  
GOOG Google Inc 35 9 25 $559,016  $3,037,425  
MRK Merck & Co 34 7 27 $299,008  $1,918,000  
MCD McDonald's Corp 33 14 19 $312,051  $429,210  
SLB Schlumberger Ltd 32 9 22 $259,014  $1,663,361  
WMT Wal-Mart Stores 30 9 21 $329,391  $1,107,423  
UTX United Technologies 29 11 17 $1,066,011  $1,061,221  
ABT Abbott Laboratories 29 10 19 $54,012  $843,377  
HD Home Depot 29 11 18 $226,946  $341,143  
C Citigroup Inc 29 9 20 $22,232  $703,963  
MMM 3M Co 28 13 14 $255,015  $1,278,780  
COP ConocoPhillips 27 5 22 $1,048,007  $526,814  
ESRX Express Scripts 27 6 21 $21,007  $1,119,813  
MDLZ Mondelez International 26 9 17 $110,012  $1,101,421  
ORCL Oracle Corp 25 8 16 $237,012  $1,479,453  
BMY Bristol-Myers Squibb 25 8 17 $166,012  $630,798  
F Ford Motor Co 25 7 18 $36,008  $192,121  
AXP American Express 25 8 16 $57,008  $486,390  
USB US Bancorp 25 8 16 $59,010  $586,811  
GS Goldman Sachs 24 8 16 $105,037  $300,570  
HON Honeywell International 23 11 12 $126,014  $347,551  
DD DuPont Co 23 8 15 $323,011  $844,306  
EBAY eBay Inc 23 5 18 $47,005  $1,354,329  
MET MetLife Inc 23 8 15 $94,010  $283,633  
KRFT Kraft Foods 23 8 15 $8,009  $306,378  
PM Philip Morris International 22 8 14 $26,012  $562,648  
V Visa Inc 22 5 17 $1,098,008  $1,434,757  
BA Boeing Co 22 8 14 $165,010  $600,900  
FB Facebook Inc 21 11 10 $524,014  $211,938  
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Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics for 2012 Stock Data Characteristics 
 Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Price 87.8100 121.6237 11.9800 56.2500 781.9300 
Capitalization 132.886 85.5541 29.0041 112.6369 394.0918 
Turnover 11.0752 31.9283 2.5987 5.6332 231.2154 
Volatility 0.2612 0.8661 -1.3093 0.2151 2.9947 
Spread 0.00028 0.00018 0.00005 0.00024 0.00084 
Illiquidity 0.3597 0.2935 0.0079 0.3097 1.334520202 
NASDAQ 0.2600 0.4431 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
 
Panel B. Summary Statistics for 2013 Stock Data Characteristics 
 Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Price 84.9069 121.3470 11.9800 55.5500 781.9300 
Capitalization 136.3436 83.6578 39.5826 112.2381 394.0918 
Turnover 6.7936 3.7463 0.6719 5.6327 18.6722 
Volatility 0.4180 1.3936 -1.0498 0.2151 8.3786 
Spread 0.00026 0.00016 0.00005 0.00024 0.00084 
Illiquidity 0.3856 0.0376 0.0008 0.0316 0.8351 
NASDAQ 0.2449 0.4345 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 3 – Daily CARs Pre-STOCK Act Amendment and Post-STOCK Act Amendment 
 
Panel A. 2012 CARs from daily market-adjusted returns using the CRSP market index 
 Equal Weight Value Weight 
 MM MAR SW MM MAR SW 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAR(-1,1) 0.99%*** 1.30%*** 0.86%** 0.47% 0.67%* 0.40% 
 (2.74) (3.82) (2.42) (1.33) (1.98) (1.15) 
CAR(-3,3) 0.80%* 1.19%** 0.63% 0.45% 0.78% 0.35% 
 (1.83) (2.46) (1.42) (1.02) (1.6) (0.78) 
CAR(-5,5) 1.52%** 1.71%** 1.41%** 0.59% 0.70% 0.56% 
 (2.42) (2.57) (2.24) (0.93) (1.05) (0.87) 
CAR(-7.7) 0.33% 0.31% 0.29% -0.07% -0.05% -0.08% 
 (0.52) (0.47) (0.46) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.12) 
CAR(-30,-2) 2.07%*** 1.90%*** 2.05%*** 0.90% 0.78% 0.94% 
 (3.5) (3.45) (3.44) (1.43) (1.42) (1.5) 
 
Panel B. 2013 CARs from daily market-adjusted returns using the CRSP market index 
 Equal Weight Value Weight 
 MM MAR SW MM MAR SW 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAR(-1,1) 0.90%*** 1.09%*** 0.76%*** 0.32% 0.46%* 0.26% 
 (3.47) (4.16) (3.05) (1.26) (1.76) (1.04) 
CAR(-3,3) 0.80%*** 1.07%** 0.63%* 0.41% 0.65% 0.31% 
 (2.3) (2.65) (1.77) (1.14) (1.61) (0.87) 
CAR(-5,5) 1.42%** 1.60%** 1.31%** 0.42% 0.59% 0.40% 
 (2.38) (2.66) (2.20) (0.69) (0.98) (0.66) 
CAR(-7.7) 0.59% 0.69% 0.57% 0.17% 0.33% 0.18% 
 (0.94) (1.15) (0.91) (0.27) (0.55) (0.29) 
CAR(-30,-2) 1.87%*** 1.98%*** 1.89%*** 0.64% 0.86% 0.71% 
 (3.11) (3.75) (3.15) (1.00) (1.63) (1.12) 
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Table 4 – Daily CARs Pre-STOCK Act Amendment 
 
Panel A. 2012 CARs from daily market-adjusted returns using the CRSP market index 
 Equal Weight Value Weight 
 MM MAR SW MM MAR SW 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAR(-5,0) 1.22%*** 1.45%*** 1.11%** 0.41% 0.54% 0.38% 
 (2.9) (3.38) (2.64) (1.00) (1.26) (0.91) 
CAR(-3,0) 0.78%* 1.07%** 0.65% 0.32% 0.53% 0.25% 
 (1.97) (2.65) (1.63) (0.82) (1.31) (0.63) 
CAR(-1,0) 0.69%* 1.15%*** 0.51% 0.42% 0.78%*** 0.30% 
 (1.98) (3.65) (1.47) (1.23) (2.47) (0.9) 
CAR(-7,0) 0.72%* 0.93%** 0.61% 0.15% 0.30% 0.10% 
 (1.69) (2.08) (1.44) (0.36) (0.68) (0.24) 
 
Panel B. 2013 CARs from daily market-adjusted returns using the CRSP market index 
 Equal Weight Value Weight 
 MM MAR SW MM MAR SW 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAR(-5,0) 1.51%*** 1.68%*** 1.40%*** 0.68%*** 0.77%*** 0.61%** 
 (5.68) (6.24) (5.34) (3.12) (2.87) (2.34) 
CAR(-3,0) 1.18%*** 1.38%*** 1.05%*** 0.65%** 0.84%*** 0.62%*** 
 (5.38) (5.63) (4.85) (2.47) (3.42) (2.83) 
CAR(-1,0) 0.81%*** 1.08%*** 0.62%*** 0.49%** 0.70%*** 0.38%* 
 (3.60) (4.87) (2.94) (2.22) (3.18) (1.77) 
CAR(-7,0) 1.05%*** 1.23%*** 0.95%*** 0.44% 0.60%* 0.40% 
 (3.28) (3.78) (3.01) (1.39) (1.86) (1.28) 
	 18	
Table 5 – Daily CARs Post-STOCK Act Amendment 
 
Panel A. 2012 CARs from daily market-adjusted returns using the CRSP market index 
 Equal Weight Value Weight 
 MM MAR SW MM MAR SW 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAR(0,1) 0.78%*** 1.03%*** 0.68%** 0.27% 0.42%* 0.22% 
 (2.81) (4.20) (2.51) (1.02) (1.71) (0.85) 
CAR(0,5) 0.79% 1.15%** 0.63%** 0.40% 0.69% 0.31% 
 (1.57) (2.16) (2.16) (0.79) (1.29) (0.62) 
CAR(0,3) 0.51% 1.00%*** 0.30% 0.36% 0.77%** 0.22% 
 (1.49) (2.87) (0.91) (1.05) (2.20) (0.67) 
 
Panel B. 2013 CARs from daily market-adjusted returns using the CRSP market index 
 Equal Weight Value Weight 
 MM MAR SW MM MAR SW 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
CAR(0,1) 0.82%*** 0.97%*** 0.71%*** 0.26% 0.36% 0.21% 
 (3.46) (4.42) (3.13) (1.14) (1.64) (0.96) 
CAR(0,5) 0.64% 0.88% 0.48% 0.21% 0.42% 0.12% 
 (1.21) (1.60) (0.90) (0.38) (0.76) (0.23) 
CAR(0,3) 0.35% 0.65%* 0.14% 0.16% 0.42% 0.03% 
 (1.06) (1.80) (0.43) (0.46) (1.16) (0.09) 
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Table 6 – 2012 Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
CAR(-5,0)i = β1Ln(Repub/Dem)i + β2Ln(Pricei) + β3Ln(MarketCapi) + β4Ln(Spreadi) + β5Ln(Illiquidityi) + 
β6Ln(Volatilityi) + β7Ln(Turnover))+ β8NASDAQi + α + εi 
The dependent variable is the CAR from (-5,0), where day 0 is the day the policy was changed. We report regression 
results when we include each of the twelve estimated CARs using market models, Scholes-Williams market models, 
and market-adjusted returns. The independent variable of interest is the natural log of the Republican Congressional 
Investors divided by Democratic Congressional Investors. (Ln(Repub/Dem)). The control variables include the 
natural of Volatility (Ln(Volatility)), the natural log of market capitalization (Ln(MarketCap)), the natural log of 
share price (Ln(Price)), the natural log of share turnover (Ln(Turnover)), and the natural log of closing bid-ask 
spreads (Ln(Spread)). We include an indicator variable equal to zero if stock i is listed on NASDAQ – zero 
otherwise. We report t-statistics in parentheses, which are obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors. *,**, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the .10, .05, and the .01 levels, respectively. 
 CAR(-5,0) 
 EW Market 
Model 
VW Market 
Model 
EW Scholes 
Williams 
VW Scholes 
Williams 
EW Adj. 
Returns 
VW Adj. 
Returns 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Ln(Repub/Dem) -0.0287** -0.0260** -0.0281** -0.0258** 0.0296* -0.0247* 
 (-2.39) (-2.19) (-2.31) (-2.17) (1.76) (-1.94) 
Ln(Price) -0.0210 -0.0135 -0.0202 -0.0136 0.0088 -0.0121 
 (-1.39) (-0.90) (-1.32) (-0.90) (0.41) (-0.75) 
Ln(MarketCap) -0.0210** -0.0199** -0.0205** -0.0197** -0.0050 -0.0201** 
 (-2.46) (-2.36) (-2.38) (-2.34) (-0.41) (-2.22) 
Ln(Spread) 0.0181** 0.0172** 0.0176** 0.0168** -0.0023 0.0169* 
 (2.25) (2.17) (2.17) (2.18) (-0.20) (1.99) 
Ln(Illiquidity) -0.0174*** -0.0160*** -0.0167*** -0.0158*** -0.0057 -0.0160*** 
 (-3.31) (-3.08) (-3.14) (-3.03) (0.44) (-2.87) 
Ln(Volatility) 0.0224 0.0155 0.0214 0.1533 -0.0083 0.0152 
 (1.62) (1.13) (1.54) (1.12) (-0.43) (1.04) 
Ln(Turnover) -0.0458*** -0.0441*** -0.0458*** -0.0442*** 0.0067 -0.0455*** 
 (-5.53) (-5.40) (-5.48) (-5.39) (0.57) (-5.18) 
NASDAQ -0.0025 -0.0033 -0.0022 -0.0031 -0.0138 -0.0045 
 (-0.25) (-0.33) (-0.22) (-0.32) (-0.98) (-0.42) 
Constant 0.7048*** 0.6376*** 0.6876*** 0.6321*** 0.0242 0.6368*** 
 (3.54) (3.25) (3.43) (3.21) (0.09) (3.02) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.4760 0.4716 0.4697 0.4702 0.0106 0.4348 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 
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Table 7 –2013  
Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
CAR(-5,0)i = β1Ln(Repub/Dem)i + β2Ln(Pricei) + β3Ln(MarketCapi) + β4Ln(Spreadi) + β5Ln(Illiquidityi) + 
β6Ln(Volatilityi) + β7Ln(Turnover))+ β8NASDAQi + α + εi 
The dependent variable is the CAR from (-5,0), where day 0 is the day the policy was changed. We report regression 
results when we include each of the twelve estimated CARs using market models, Scholes-Williams market models, 
and market-adjusted returns. The independent variable of interest is the natural log of the Republican Congressional 
Investors divided by Democratic Congressional Investors. (Ln(Repub/Dem)). The control variables include the 
natural of Volatility (Ln(Volatility)), the natural log of market capitalization (Ln(MarketCap)), the natural log of 
share price (Ln(Price)), the natural log of share turnover (Ln(Turnover)), and the natural log of closing bid-ask 
spreads (Ln(Spread)). We include an indicator variable equal to zero if stock i is listed on NASDAQ – zero 
otherwise. We report t-statistics in parentheses, which are obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors. *,**, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the .10, .05, and the .01 levels, respectively. 
 CAR(-5,0) 
 EW Market 
Model 
VW Market 
Model 
EW Scholes 
Williams 
VW Scholes 
Williams 
EW Adj. 
Returns 
VW Adj. 
Returns 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Ln(Repub/Dem) -0.0023 -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0017 
 (-0.31) (-0.39) (-0.33) (-0.37) (-0.22) (-0.22) 
Ln(Price) -0.0084 -0.0065 -0.0075 -0.0060 -0.0050 -0.0050 
 (1.43) (-1.11) (-1.26) (-1.02) (-0.83) (-0.83) 
Ln(MarketCap) -0.0115 -0.0120 -0.115 -0.0122 -0.0131* -0.0131* 
 (-1.55) (-1.62) (-1.53) (-1.63) (-1.72) (-1.72) 
Ln(Spread) 0.0018 0.0024 0.0021 0.0027 0.0042 0.0042 
 (0.26) (0.36) (0.30) (0.40) (0.61) (0.61) 
Ln(Illiquidity) -0.0127*** -0.0129*** -0.0121*** -0.0127*** -0.0135*** -0.0135*** 
 (-3.36) (-3.42) (-3.16) (-3.34) (-3.48) (-3.48) 
Ln(Volatility) 0.0027 0.0014 0.0021 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.91) (0.47) (0.71) (0.37) (0.26) (0.26) 
Ln(Turnover) -0.0040 -0.0093 -0.0051 -0.0099 -0.0133* -0.0133* 
 (-0,84) (-1.25) (-0.67) (-1.31) (-1.73) (-1.73) 
NASDAQ -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0056 -0.073 -0.073 
 (-0.84) (-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.86) (-1.10) (-1.10) 
Constant 0.1516 0.1574 0.1573 0.1648 0.1986 0.1895 
 (1.09) (1.13) (1.11) (1.17) (1.39) (1.32) 
       
       
Adjusted R2 0.2045 0.1843 0.1666 0.1697 0.1804 0.1804 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 
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Table 8 –  2012 Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
CAR(-5,0)i = β1Ln(MinInvest)i + β2Ln(Pricei) + β3Ln(MarketCapi) + β4Ln(Spreadi) + β5Ln(Illiquidityi) + 
β6Ln(Volatilityi) + β7Ln(Turnover))+ β8NASDAQi + α + εi 
The dependent variable is the CAR from (-5,0), where day 0 is the day the policy was changed. We report 
regression results when we include each of the twelve estimated CARs using market models, Scholes-Williams 
market models, and market-adjusted returns. The independent variable of interest is the natural log of the 
Republican minimum investment divided by Democratic minimum investment. (Ln(MinInvest)). The control 
variables include the natural of Volatility (Ln(Volatility)), the natural log of market capitalization 
(Ln(MarketCap)), the natural log of share price (Ln(Price)), the natural log of share turnover (Ln(Turnover)), 
and the natural log of closing bid-ask spreads (Ln(Spread)). We include an indicator variable equal to zero if 
stock i is listed on NASDAQ – zero otherwise. We report t-statistics in parentheses, which are obtained from 
White (1980) robust standard errors. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the .10, .05, and the .01 
levels, respectively. 
 CAR(-5,0) 
 EW Market 
Model 
VW Market 
Model 
EW Scholes 
Williams 
VW 
Scholes 
Williams 
EW Adj. 
Returns 
VW Adj. 
Returns 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Ln(MinInvest) -0.0049* -0.0040 -0.0047 -0.0039 0.0082** -0.0033 
 (-1.75) (-1.44) (-1.65) (-1.40) (2.17) (-1.12) 
Ln(Price) -0.0245 -0.0163 -0.0235 -0.0163 0.0145 -0.0144 
 (-1.56) (-1.05) (-1.48) (-1.05) (0.69) (-0.86) 
Ln(MarketCap) -0.0199** -0.0185** -0.0193** -0.0183** -0.0038 -0.0184* 
 (-2.26) (-2.13) (-2.18) (-2.10) (-0.32) (-1.97) 
Ln(Spread) 0.0128 0.0124 0.0124 0.0120 0.0027 0.0123 
 (1.63) (1.60) (1.56) (1.54) (0.25) (1.47) 
Ln(Illiquidity) -0.0183*** -0.0167*** -0.0175*** -0.0164*** -0.0041 -0.0165*** 
 -(3.35) (-3.09) (-3.18) (-3.04) (-0.56) (-2.86) 
Ln(Volatility) 0.0216 0.0145 0.0206 0.0143 -0.0094 0.0140 
 (1.51) (1.03) (1.43) (1.01) (-0.49) (0.923) 
Ln(Turnover) -0.0437*** -0.0420*** -0.0436*** -0.0420*** 0.0058 -0.0433*** 
 (-5.19) (-5.05) (-5.14) (-5.04) 0.5159 (-4.86) 
NASDAQ 0.0044 0.0030 0.0046 0.0031 -0.0207 0.0016 
 (0.45) (0.31) (0.46) (0.32) (-1.57) (0.15) 
Constant 0.6413*** 0.5713*** 0.6232*** 0.5648*** 0.0283 0.5641** 
 (3.20) (2.89) (3.08) (2.84) (0.10) (2.66) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.4447 0.4384 0.4381 0.4365 0.0457 0.4012 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 
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Table 9 – 2013 Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
CAR(-5,0)i = β1Ln(MinInvest)i + β2Ln(Pricei) + β3Ln(MarketCapi) + β4Ln(Spreadi) + β5Ln(Illiquidityi) + 
β6Ln(Volatilityi) + β7Ln(Turnover))+ β8NASDAQi + α + εi 
The dependent variable is the CAR from (-5,0), where day 0 is the day the policy was changed. We report regression 
results when we include each of the twelve estimated CARs using market models, Scholes-Williams market models, 
and market-adjusted returns. The independent variable of interest is the natural log of the Republican minimum 
investment divided by Democratic minimum investment. (Ln(MinInvest)). The control variables include the natural 
of Volatility (Ln(Volatility)), the natural log of market capitalization (Ln(MarketCap)), the natural log of share 
price (Ln(Price)), the natural log of share turnover (Ln(Turnover)), and the natural log of closing bid-ask spreads 
(Ln(Spread)). We include an indicator variable equal to zero if stock i is listed on NASDAQ – zero otherwise. We 
report t-statistics in parentheses, which are obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors. *,**, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the .10, .05, and the .01 levels, respectively. 
 CAR(-5,0) 
 EW Market 
Model 
VW Market 
Model 
EW Scholes 
Williams 
VW Scholes 
Williams 
EW Adj. 
Returns 
VW Adj. 
Returns 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Ln(MinInvest) 0.0033 0.0030 0.0034 0.00307 0.0034 0.0034 
 (1.37) (1.23) (1.40) (1.24) (1.37) (1.37) 
Ln(Price) -0.0098* -0.0079 -0.0089 -0.0075 -0.0063 -0.0063 
 (-1.77) (-1.43) (-1.59) (-1.33) (-1.11) (-1.11) 
Ln(MarketCap) -0.0087 -0.0094 -0.0085 -0.0096 -0.0102 -0.0102 
 (-1.15) (-1.24) (-1.13) (-1.26) (-1.33) (-1.33) 
Ln(Spread) 0.0014 0.0020 0.0017 0.0023 0.0039 0.0039 
 (0.21) (0.31) (0.25) (0.35) (0.58) (0.58) 
Ln(Illiquidity) -0.0114*** -0.0017*** -0.0107*** -0.0115*** -0.0122*** -0.0122*** 
 (-2.99) (-3.07) (-2.78) (-2.99) (-3.10) (-3.10) 
Ln(Volatility) 0.0038 0.0024 0.0032 0.0022 0.0019 0.0019 
 (1.29) (0.83) (1.10) (0.73) (0.63) (0.63) 
Ln(Turnover) -0.0008 -0.0064 -0.0018 -0.0070 -0.0100 -0.0100 
 (-0.11) (-0.84) (-0.23) (-0.90) (-1.27) (-1.27) 
NASDAQ -0.0062 -0.0060 -0.0062 -.0063 -0.0080 -0.0080 
 (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-1.24) (-1.24) 
Constant 0.1033 0.1124 0.1072 0.1191 0.1411 0.1411 
 (0.74) (0.80) (0.76) (0.84) (0.98) (0.98) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.2384 0.2111 0.2031 0.1979 0.2161 0.2161 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 
